Slide #1.

Chapter 8 Neighborhood Choice
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Slide #2.

Objective  Understand the formation of neighborhoods  Why do people segregate into different neighborhoods?  What are the consequences of segregation?
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Slide #3.

Diversity versus Segregation  Household     differ in Income Race Ethnicity Education  Integrated neighborhood: different households have an equal representation.  Segregated neighborhood: a given type of household is a majority.
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Slide #4.

 Per capita income in Boston by census tract  How equal is income distribution?
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Slide #5.

 Educational Attainment in Denver by census tract  Are census tracts with high education attainment clustered or randomly distributed?
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Slide #6.

Residential Choice  In this chapter we extend the model of residential choice to account for other factors besides proximity to work
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Slide #7.

Residential Choice    People value neighborhood attributes, e.g., school, park space, safety, referred to as local public goods People differ in their preferences These attributes differ from one neighborhood to another
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Slide #8.

Local Public Goods  Local- Goods available for people living in a certain locality to consumer  Public Goods-They are:   Non rival in consumption- consumption by one does not limit the value to others Non excludable – no mechanism to exclude people from consuming
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Slide #9.

Rival in Consumption Consumer 0 0 0 10 MSB=MPB 0
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Slide #10.

Non Rivalry in Consumption Consumer 10 10 10 10 MSB>MPB 10
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Slide #11.

Externality from Consumption Consumer 2 2 10 MSB>MPB Semi private good 2 2
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Slide #12.

Local Public Goods  Are goods that can be consumed by everyone living in a certain locality- non excludable  They tend to be public in natureconsumption of one does not diminish the value to another- non rival
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Slide #13.

Financing local Public Goods  It is not easy to charge people based on use.  Local public goods are financed through   A head tax: equal amount paid by all A property tax: tax levied on the property value  Each tax system creates different incentives for household to locate (potentially creating segregated neighborhoods?)
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Slide #14.

1. Local Public Goods and Segregation  We first explore the role of local public goods in neighborhood segregation.  Do differences in household characteristics or preferences over local public goods generate diverse or segregated neighborhoods?
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Slide #15.

1. Local Public Goods and Segregation  Local public goods: a park.  Three individuals and different preferences    High Medium Low  Park financed through a head tax
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Slide #16.

Differences in Demand for Park Shown are the demand curves for acres of park for each of three individuals The cost per acre is $60. The MC is $20 since the cost will be shared equally. How many acres of park does each one choose? Variation in demand creates disagreement about how large the park should be
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Slide #17.

Majority Rule  Suppose we use majority voting to choose between different park sizes.  According to the Median Voter Rule, the voting outcome will match the preferences of the median voter.  The median voter is the person whose preferences lie in the middle of all preferences.
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Slide #18.

Majority Rule Suppose we use majority rule to determine between 6, 12 and 28 acres of park.  Hold elections between pairs of different park sizes.  The median voter always wins.  Two of the three citizens are left with a suboptimal choice  H M L win 6 vs. 12 12 12 6 12 12 vs. 28 28 12 12 12 12
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Slide #19.

Formation of Municipalities  Since a given park size does not satisfy all three groups, they form three municipalities with citizens with similar park preferences  By voting with their feet, citizens sort themselves into homogenous communities and each gets his preferred park size. Causes of segregated neighborhoods: 1.Variation in demand for local public goods
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Slide #20.

2. Variation in the taxed good    Assume instead that property taxes were used to finance provision of the park For simplicity, lets consider individuals with low park demand Assume they have different property values.
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Slide #21.

2. Variation in the taxed good  The cost of providing a 6 acre park is $360(=$60x6).  What should the property tax rate be? (t*240+t*100+t*20=360) Property value $ (000) Tax payment High 240 Medium 100 ? Low 20 20 240 100
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Slide #22.

2. Variation in the taxed good  High valued property owners have an incentive to form a municipality of only high valued properties and pay $120 instead of $240. Property value $ (000) High Tax payment 240 Mixed Municipality 240 High only 120 Medium 100 100 - Low 20 20 -
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Slide #23.

2. Variation in Consumption of the taxed good  The difference in tax amounts creates incentives for people within the same demand group to segregate:   The high value property owners form their own municiaplty The medium value property owners prefer to live in their own municipality rather than live with the low
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Slide #24.

2. Variation in Consumption of the taxed good  With three types of preferences and three property values: High Demand High property value High Demand High Demand Medium property value Low property value Medium Demand High property value Medium Demand Medium Demand Medium property value Low property value Low Demand High property value Low Demand Low Demand Medium property value Low property value Causes of segregated neighborhoods: 2.Variation in the taxed good
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Slide #25.

3.Neighborhood Externalities Types of externalities:  Kid Imitation    Adult externalities:     Positive adult role models for kids Classmates in school: focused vs. disruptive Job information drug use Positive externalities increase with income and education level. Who gets the desirable neighbors?
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Slide #26.

A Model of Neighborhood Choice  Two neighborhoods differ in their income mixes.  All households prefer high income neighborhoods  Households compete by bidding for land and housing.
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Slide #27.

A Model of Neighborhood Choice  Model   setup Two neighborhoods, each with 100 lots Two income groups (high and low), each with 100 households  Only difference between neighborhoods is income mix.
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Slide #28.

A Model of Neighborhood Choice High income Low income Neighborhood A Neighborhood B Because the neighborhoods have an identical mix of high and low income households, rent in A=rent in B
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Slide #29.

Rent Premium    Rent premium for A= rent in A- rent in B, is defined as the extra amount of rent a household is willing to pay for neighborhood A, Rent premium with 50-50 mix will be zero since both neighborhoods are identical. Rent premium increases with the number of high income households
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Slide #30.

Premium Curves Point j: Premium of lowincome household (55 high, 45 low) = $5 Point k: Premium of highincome household (55 high, 45 low) = $8 The premium curve for the high income household is higher than that of the low income household
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Slide #31.

Unstable equilibrium Equilibrium requires that everyone in the same neighborhood pay the same rent. Point i is an integrated equilibrium. Households pay the same amount for each neighborhood Point i is unstable equilibrium since a movement of population will generate a different equilibrium
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Slide #32.

Segregated Equilibrium High income Low income Neighborhood A Neighborhood B Neighborhood A becomes more desirable, therefore the rent premium with the new mix will be positive.
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Slide #33.

Segregated Equilibrium The premium for the high income is higher than that for the low income household. High income households outbid low income households so that they displace low income households in area A This increases the mix of high income households moving away from point i Point s is the new equilibrium with segregated neighborhoods. Self Reinforcing Effects lead to extreme outcomes
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Slide #34.

Segregated Equilibrium High income Low income Neighborhood A Neighborhood B All high income households locate in one neighborhood
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Slide #35.

Integrated Equilibrium Here, the integrated equilibrium is stable because the premium curve for the low income households is steeper than that of the high income households
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Slide #36.

Mixed Neighborhoods A third possibility is a mixed neighborhood. Point m is a stable equilibrium since a deviation away from m results in a movement back to it.
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Slide #37.

The Role of Lot Size   When variation in land consumption is allowed integration is more likely. Landowner perspective: high-income household with larger $5 premium loses bidding war against two low-income $5 households $8
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Slide #38.

Minimum Lot Size Zoning  Sometimes governments specify a minimum lot size for residential development.  Under Minimum Lot Size (MLS) zoning low income households are more likely to be outbid by high income households  The goal is to exclude households whose tax contribution falls short of their consumption of the public good
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Slide #39.

Minimum Lot Size Zoning  What are the implications of MLS zoning on    Neighborhood segregation? Low income neighborhoods? Population density and urban sprawl?
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Slide #40.

3.Schools and Neighborhood Choice   Schools quality is an important neighborhood attribute There is evidence that differences in demand for school spending creates neighborhood segregation  But we can also argue that neighborhood segregation leads to differences in school performance  Self reinforcing effects generate extreme outcomes: Segregation is an equilibrium
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Slide #41.

3.Schools and Neighborhood Choice  Education Production Function Achievement = f (H, P, T, S)  H: Home environment  P: Peer group  T: Teachers  S: Class size  Externalities from the peer group  Favorable peers are smart, motivated, not disruptive  Evidence that low achievers have the most to gain  Evidence that peer effects most important for grades 5-12
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Slide #42.

3.Schools and Neighborhood Choice  Income Segregated neighborhoods arise if   Demand for education differs. High income households demand more school spending form a separate municipality with higher spending on education and higher taxes Correlation between income and achievement and WTP for neighborhoods with high achievement is higher for high income households.
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Slide #43.

4. Crime and Neighborhood Choice  Crime rates are generally lower in high income neighborhoods  There is a positive premium for low crime neighborhoods and high income households have a higher premium for low crime neighborhoods  If there is a positive correlation between low crime rates and household incomes then segregation results.
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Slide #44.

Consequences of Segregation  The   Spatial Mismatch Higher commuting costs to the poor and minority households due to their concentration in central city, far from suburban jobs. Lower employment rates for poor and minority households.
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Slide #45.

Consequences of Segregation  Schools and the Poverty Trap: low income neighborhoods are likely to have future low incomes since:    Lower school funding in low income areas generates lower achievement Problems like drug abuse and marital stability are more prevalent in low income neighborhoods. This implies that the cost of education in low-income neighborhoods is higher. Fact: Central city students are twice as likely as suburban students to drop out of high school
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Slide #46.

Welfare Implications of Segregation  Segregation hurts the low income groups but creates benefits for the high income groups.  Economic rationale for promoting integration   Externalities from peer effects Largest gains to the low income groups
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Slide #47.

Assignment
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