Safety terminology Term Definition Accident (or mishap) An unplanned event or sequence of events which results in human death or injury, damage to property, or to the environment. An overdose of insulin is an example of an accident. Hazard A condition with the potential for causing or contributing to an accident. A failure of the sensor that measures blood glucose is an example of a hazard. Damage A measure of the loss resulting from a mishap. Damage can range from many people being killed as a result of an accident to minor injury or property damage. Damage resulting from an overdose of insulin could be serious injury or the death of the user of the insulin pump. Hazard severity An assessment of the worst possible damage that could result from a particular hazard. Hazard severity can range from catastrophic, where many people are killed, to minor, where only minor damage results. When an individual death is a possibility, a reasonable assessment of hazard severity is ‘very high’. Hazard probability The probability of the events occurring which create a hazard. Probability values tend to be arbitrary but range from ‘probable’ (say 1/100 chance of a hazard occurring) to ‘implausible’ (no conceivable situations are likely in which the hazard could occur). The probability of a sensor failure in the insulin pump that results in an overdose is probably low. Risk This is a measure of the probability that the system will cause an accident. The risk is assessed by considering the hazard probability, the hazard severity, and the probability that the hazard will lead to an accident. The risk of an insulin overdose is probably medium to low. Chapter 11 Security and Dependability 33
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Hazard Communication Labels – NFPA 704 – hazards and severity ratings White = Other Special Flammabili Blue = Health Hazards ty Hazard Hazards 0= normal material that W= reactivity to water poses no health Yellow = Instability Red = Flammability Health Instabilit OX = oxidizer Hazards Hazard 1 = slight hazard yHazards Hazard SA = simple asphyxiant 0= normally stable 0=2will not burn hazard = moderate 1 = slight hazard Other 1 =3flashpoint = extremeabove hazard 2 = moderate hazard Special 200°F 4 = deadly hazard Hazard 2 = flashpoint between 3 = extreme hazard 100 – 200°F 4 = deadly hazard 3 = flashpoint below 100°F 4 = flashpoint less than Source: OTIEC PPT 10-hr. General Industry – Hazard Communication 30 Created by OTIEC Outreach Resources Workgroup
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Explicit PCA Regression on training/test set • We have for training set: ˆ train train train  yn Tnh wh  yn ˆ train train trainT train  1 trainT train yn Tnh Thn Tnh  Thn yn • And for the test set: ˆ test test test train yk Tkh wh  yk ˆ test yk Tkhtest ThntrainT Tnhtrain  X test km T mh B train T yn trainT train  1 trainT train Thn Tnh Thn yn   1 trainT hn 
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Hazard Communication Labels • HMIS label – Intended for “In-plant” (workplace) labeling compliance – Color-coded bars (Product identifier) – Numerical scale, 0-4, with 0 as lowest HEALTH hazard and 4 as highest hazard FLAMMABILITY • • • • • 0 1 2 3 4 = = = = = minimal hazard slight hazard moderate hazard serious hazard severe hazard PPT 10-hr. General Industry – Hazard Communication PHYSICAL HAZARD PERSONAL PROTECTION Source: OTIEC 32 Created by OTIEC Outreach Resources Workgroup
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32: a=GuardarCas(u,a,cas) Sistema de selecció d’atributs basat en algorismes genètics 33: a Fi iteració fiCas(cas) 34: GuardarAtr(a,cas) Diagrama de seqüència (IV) 35: GuardarCas(validacio,cas) Fi iteració fiFitxer(train) 36: [FiFitxer(train)], train 37: CreaGA(), train, validacio 38: CreaPoblacio() 39: pob 40: InitPobAleatori(pob) 41: AvalPob(pob,avaluacions,train,validacio) 42: Ind=AgafaIndiv(pob) 43: *![FI(validacio)], cv=AgafaCas(validacio) 44: *![Fi(train)], ct=AgafaCas(train) 45: a=AvalInd(Ind,ct,cv) Fi iteracions Fi(validacio) Fi(train) 46: res=Acumula(a,res) 47: Guardar(avaluacios,res,Ind) 48: ![HiHaInd(pob),avaluacions 49: elit=BuscaElitisme(pob) 50: pob=Seleccio(pob) 51: pob=Creua(pob) 52: pob=muta(pob) 53: pob=TornaElitisme(pob,elit) 54: AvalPob(pob,avaluacions,train,validacio) Motivació Introducció als algorismes genètics Algorismes genètics en selecció d’atributs Disseny Introducció a la selecció d’atributs 55: ind=AgafaInd(pob) Resultats Concl. i Línies de futur 56: cv=AgafaCas(validacio) 57: ct=AgafaCas(train)
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Object features as model annotations agent Patron Name Email attributes features entity Train Speed Acceleration DoorsState On annotation association Name Patron; Type Agent Def Any person currently registered to a system’s library for some valid period. Synonyms Borrower Name Train; Type Entity Def Any train currently in operation in the system. Has Speed %…%; Acceleration %…%; DoorsState %…%; DomInvar MovingIffNonZeroSpeed: ( tr: Train) (Moving (tr)  tr.Speed 0) NonZeroSpeedIfNonZeroAcceler: ( tr: Train) (tr.Acceleration 0  tr.Speed 0) ClosedIfNotOpen: ( tr: Train) (tr.DoorsState ‘open’  tr.DoorsState = ‘closed’) Init For any train tr: tr.Speed = 0 tr.Acceleration = 0 tr.DoorsState = ‘closed’ Issue How about trains under maintenance? Block … Name On Def The current localization of a train on system blocks. DomInvar OnTwoBlocksAtMost: A train is on one or two successive blocks at any time. Init Any train entering the system is on the main station block
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Hazard Ident. / Risk Assess. Procedure HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODS: - Process hazard checklist - Hazard survey: DOW index - HAZOP hazard & operability study - Safety review RISK ASSESSMENT: - What can go wrong & how ? - What are the chances ? - Consequences ? EXTREMES: - Low probability - Minimal consequences System description Hazard identification Scenario identification Accident probability Accident consequences Risk determination risk & hazard acceptable ? N Modify design Y Accept system 5
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Variables (example) • Value of Risk (V. R.) The Value of Risk is the result of the product of Impact and Probability (V.R.=I*P) – – – – – – – – – – – – – – • Value of Risk (V. R.) Value Description Low (L) 1-3 The level is not critical Medium (M) 4 - 5 Specific monitoring and actions are required High (A) 6-9 The risk requires maximum priority Impact of Risk (I) The Impact of the Risk indicates the relationship between the Risk and the Project Activities Impact of Risk (I) Value Description Low (L) 1 Impact in only one activity Medium (M) 2 Impact on more activities High (A) 3 Impact on activities of the Critical Path Probability of Risk (P) The Probability of Risk indicates the possibility that the problem effectively takes place Probability of Risk (P) Value Description Low (L) 1 Low Probability Medium (M) 2 Medium Probability High (A) 3 High Probability Manageability of Risk (M.R.) The Manageability of the Risk indicates the possibility of monitoring the possible problem and of effectively operate with the defined mitigation actions. – – – – Manageability of Risk (M.R.) Value Description Low (L) 3 It is not possible to guarantee the problem monitoring Medium (M) 2 The risk is partially under control and actions are partially applicable High (A) 1 The risk is under control and the actions are totally applicable Source: Booz Allen
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Breaking down sources of total risk Total risk= systematic portion (market risk) + unsystematic portion (firm-specific risk)  Market risk (systematic risk, non-diversifiable risk, beta risk) – portion of a security’s stand-alone risk that cannot be eliminated through diversification. It is affected by economy-wide sources of risk that affect the overall stock market.  Firm-specific risk (unsystematic risk, diversifiable risk, idiosyncratic risk) – portion of a security’s stand-alone risk that can be eliminated through proper diversification.  If a portfolio is well diversified, unsystematic is very small. Rational, risk-averse investors are just concerned with portfolio standard deviation σp, which is based upon market risk. That is: investor care little about a stock’s firm–specific risk. 40
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Objectives Students should be able to: Define risk management process: risk management, risk assessment, risk analysis, risk appetite, risk treatment, accept residual risk Define treat risk terms: risk acceptance/risk retention, risk avoidance, risk mitigation/risk reduction, risk transference Describe threat types: natural, unintentional, intentional, intentional (nonphysical) Define threat agent types: hacker/crackers, criminals, terrorists, industry spies, insiders Perform risk analysis using techniques: qualitative, quantitative Define vulnerability, SLE, ARO, ALE, due diligence, due care
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Security Planning: An Applied Approach | 03/18/19 | 2 Objectives Students should be able to: Define risk management process: risk management, risk assessment, risk analysis, risk appetite, risk treatment, accept residual risk Define treat risk terms: risk acceptance/risk retention, risk avoidance, risk mitigation/risk reduction, risk transference Describe threat types: natural, unintentional, intentional, intentional (non-physical) Define threat agent types: hacker/crackers, criminals, terrorists, industry spies, insiders Describe risk analysis strategies: qualitative, quantitative Define vulnerability, SLE, ARO, ALE, due diligence, due care
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Surface Parcels • Established Map Kiosk at Tax Sales Office • $$$ Funding Opportunity $$$ • Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 requires West Virginia to develop state and local hazard mitigation plans. • Potential funding for digital parcel development in West Virginia from FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) coordinated through the State Hazard Mitigation Office
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Risk Management  All risks are documented. This includes a short description of the risk type (schedule, cost, technical); severity (low, moderate, high); risk mitigation plan; and status of the risk mitigation activity.  Metrics must be used to measure the effect of the risk and to identify if it is indeed occurring.  Everyone on the project is encouraged to identify risks during any management or technical meeting.  Do not shoot the messenger!  Once a risk is identified and a risk mitigation plan created, it is assigned to a responsible person. Risks are monitored and plans updated until the risk is reduced to an acceptable level.  Read the article by Conrow and Shishido to find out how specific risk issues were dealt with on the TRW project.
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Remote Sensing for Hazard Mitigation and Resource Protection in Pacific Latin America Overview: This is a 5-year, $2.3 million project supported by NSF, which focuses on developing remote sensing tools and validation methods for hazard mitigation and resource protection in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Ecuador. We are working towards two important goals: (1) to develop formal linkages among MTU and geoscience agencies in Pacific Latin America, focusing on the collaborative development of remote sensing tools for hazard mitigation and water resource development; (2) to build a new educational system of applied research and engineering, using two existing educational programs at MTU: the Peace Corp/Master’s International program in Natural Hazards which features a 2-year field assignment, and an undergraduate “Enterprise” program, which gives teams of civil, environmental, and geological engineering students the opportunity to work on real-world problems over multiple years in a business-like setting.
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